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In 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall described an American sys-
tem of higher education that was predominantly private and elitist 
in nature.1 For nearly a century and a half thereafter, the courts had 
no place on campus. A student traded his constitutional rights for the 
privilege of a college education,2 and colleges enforced their own 
system of norms and values.3 Courts of the day referred to the student-
1. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 640-49 
(1819). But see O'Neill, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 155, 
156-58, 171 (1970) for the suggestion that Marshall's description of higher education was 
inaccurate at the time and is even more inaccurate today. 
2, See Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 25!1, 197 N.W. 510, 513 (1924) (female 
students airing grievance in the public press sufficient grounds for dismissal). Cf. Mc-
Auliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). 
3. See Board of Trustees v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 633-34, 62 S. 827, 830-31 (1914), 
affd. 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (entrance to a state university conditioned upon pledge not to 
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university relationship in terms of contract4 and in loco parentis.5 
Higher education existed in its own separate world, where the Con-
stitution was discussed but rarely applied. 
The relationship of the law to the college campus has changed 
drastically in the past fifteen years. The rising student militancy of 
the 1960's, commonly known as the students' rights movement,6 and 
the willingness of the courts to enforce student rights7 have restruc-
tured the relationship between the university and its students. Con-
stitutional rights are no longer waived by college enrollment.8 Simi-
larly, contract theory and in loco parentis have either fallen into dis-
use or have been repudiated.9 
One outgrowth of court enforcement of student constitutional 
rights has been a series of cases limiting the right of a university to 
censor student newspapers.1° Freed from the shackles of the univer-
sity's editorial control, student writers may now speak with a frank-
ness unheard of on campus even ten years ago; but these decisions 
have produced an unprecedented situation for university administra-
tors. On the one hand, outspoken student newspapers have created a 
join fraternities); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N:Y.S. 435 (1928) 
(female student dismissed for not being "a typical Syracuse girl"). See generally Devel-
opments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1135-37 (1968) [here-
inafter Developments]. 
4. The use of contract theory in the college setting is exemplified by State v. White, 
82 Ind. 278, 286 (1882), where the court noted: "Every student, upon his admission into 
an institution of learning, impliedly promises to submit to •.• all the necessary and 
proper rules and regulations which have been, or may thereafter be, adopted [by the 
institution] •••• " 
5. See Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913). See generally 
Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947). In loco parentis refers 
to the idea that a college takes the place of the parent and assumes some of the parental 
duties. 
6. For the history and perspectives of the movement, see Students Protest, 395 AN-
NALS, May 1971, at 1-194. 
7. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968). See also Schwartz, The Student, the Uni-
versity, and the First Amendment, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 635 (1970); Van Alstyne, The 
Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 290 (1968); 
Project-Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder, 1970 DuKE L.J. 763; Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 1128-43. 
8. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), dismissed 
as moot sub nom. Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968). See also 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969). 
9. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 930 (1961); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Gold-
berg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). 
10. See notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text. The term "student newspaper" as 
used throughout this Note refers to those newspapers which are official student organi-
zations of a university. It is assumed that the newspaper has met the prescribed re-
quirements for achieving that status. The term therefore does not include "underground 
newspapers" which, though they may be published by students and distributed on 
campus, have no formal ties to the university. 
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serious potential for libelous and other irresponsible publications.11 
Often large12 and influential,18 these newspapers can damage careers 
and reputations. On the other hand, the newspaper, and the students 
connected with it, may be incapable of compensating for the damaged 
reputations of those defamed. The student author and editors re-
sponsible for the defamation may be judgment proof. The newspaper 
itself may be an unincorporated association not subject to suit;14 even 
when suable, it may have few assets. Therefore, the university be-
comes a prime target for the defamed plaintiff. 
Although several articles have suggested that the university may 
be liable for the defamatory torts of a student newspaper,15 no re-
ported case so holding has been found. In fact, Langford v. Vanderbilt 
University16 stood for thirteen years as the only reported case of a 
university being sued for libel in a student publication. In that case, 
the university argued that "it was not liable under the rule of re-
spondeat superior, because the publication was not made by it or by 
any servant or agent for it."17 The court, however, did not reach this 
issue, holding that the publication was privileged.18 Recently, Scelfo 
v. Rutgers University19 raised the same issue concerning the relation-
ship of the university to its student newspaper. But again the court 
was not forced to reach squarely the issue of the university's liability, 
since it held that the publication was not defamatory and, alterna-
tively, was privileged under the doctrine of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.20 This lack of precedent belies the significance of the prob-
lem. An informal survey of twenty-six college and university attorneys 
II. For example, Wayne State University's student newspaper, The South End, 
recently published an allegedly anti-Semitic series of articles which caused a furor 
within the Detroit-area Jewish community. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 31, 1973, at 14-A, 
col. 1. 
12. An informal survey of student newspapers conducted by the Review disclosed 
that the 26 student newspapers which responded had annual budgets totaling 3.6 mil-
lion dollars. See Appendix infra. See also Hudgins, Academic Freedom and the Student 
Press, 6 WAKE FoREsr INTRA. L. R.Ev. 40, 41 (1969). 
13. For example, one campus commentator believes that the Michigan Daily is the 
most powerful student political force on The University of Michigan campus. Michigan 
Daily, April 16, 1969, at 4, col. 7. See also Abbott, The Student Press: Some First Im-
pressions, 16 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 1, 6-9 (1969). 
14. See Marshall v. Longshoremen Local 6, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 
211 (1962), for a brief survey of the case law on the liability of unincorporated associa-
tions. ,,,..-------- -- -
15. Abbott, supra note 13, at 13-14; Fishbein, The University's Right of Control over 
Student Publications, 5 COLLEGE CoUNSEL 65 (1970); Trammell, Student Publications and 
Other Sources of Libel Within the University, in 3 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE NAU.. 
ASSN. OF Col.LEGE AND UNIV. ATIORNEYS 7 (1963). 
16. 44 Tenn. App. 694, 318 S.W .2d 568 (1958). 
17. 44 Tenn. App. at 699, 318 S.W.2d at 571. 
18. 44 Tenn. App. at 710-ll, 318 S.W.2d at 576. 
19. 116 N.J. Super. 403, 282 A.2d 445 (1971). 
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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conducted by the Review uncovered seven unreported suits against 
universities for libelous material in student publications.21 
The implications of the past decade's expansion of first amend-
ment rights are somewhat paradoxical. This expansion has created 
a threat of a greater potential of defamation in student newspapers. 
At the same time, a concurrent expansion of the protection afforded 
the press for defamatory publications has reduced the likelihood of 
a successful suit. 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,22 the Court held that a public 
official could not recover damages for defamatory falsehood relating 
to his official conduct without proving "actual malice," which the 
Court defined as knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard of the 
truth. In later cases the Court broadened the coverage of the New 
York Times privilege by first expanding the definition of public offi-
cials23 and later extending the doctrine to public figures acting in 
matters of public interest.24 Furthermore, the Court narrowed the 
scope of "actual malice" by defining reckless disregard of the truth to 
mean false statements made with a high degree of awareness of their 
probable falsity.25 This definition was further limited to include only 
those statements about which the speaker entertained serious doubts 
when made.26 
Most recently, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,21 the Court 
focused on the character of the reported event rather than of the 
individual involved. Four members of the Court agreed that the 
"actual malice" standard was applicable to a private individual's 
claim if the alleged defamatory matter was of general public con-
cern.28 The fifth member of the majority limited his concurrence to 
reports concerning the actions of public officials with which private 
individuals are connected.29 Three dissenting Justices in Rosenbloom 
expressed a willingness to re-examine the scope of the New York 
Times doctrine itself and, at least where a private individual is con-
21. Two universities provided citations. La Barge v. Daily Orange, Civil No. 70-6597 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., 5th Dist., April 8, 1972) (dismissed for failure to prosecute); Bruex v. 
Snyder, Civil No. 724207H, (Mich. Cir. Ct., Kalamazoo County, filed November 2, 
1972) (This action against the Western Michigan University Herald was active as of 
Jan. 1, 1973.). 
22. 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
23. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81 (1966). 
24. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
25. Garrison v. Lonisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). 
26. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
27. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
28. This position was expressed by Justice Brennan in an opinion with which Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun concurred. Justice Black concurred separately, 
reiterating his belief that "the First Amendment does not permit the recovery of libel 
judgments against the news media even when statements are broadcast with knowledge 
they are false." 403 U.S. at 57. 
29. 403 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring). 
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cerned, permit recovery upon proof of negligence and actual damage 
while eliminating or restricting the possibility of punitive damages.30 
Clearly, the New York Times doctrine stands as a significant barrier 
to the imposition of liability for defamation. Given the division 
among the Justices in Rosenbloom and the recent addition to the 
Court of two new Justices since that decision, however, the precise 
relationship between the first amendment and state defamation law 
may be in a state of flux.31 
While attention will occasionally be drawn to the impact of the 
New York Times privilege, this Note largely assumes that a defamed 
plaintiff is capable of overcoming the constitutional barriers imposed 
by New York Times and its progeny. In other words, the assumption 
is made that libelous statements either fall outside the constitutional 
privilege or that the plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice in the 
student authors or editors.82 The Note will analyze the traditional 
theories which may be invoked to establish the university's liability 
for defamatory material in student publications.83 First, a range of 
student newspaper-university relationships will be examined with 
respect to vicarious liability. As will be seen, this issue is complicated 
by possible first amendment limitations on a public university's right 
to control its student publications for libel. Second, an alternative 
theory of personal, rather than vicarious, liability will be considered. 
In conclusion, several methods will be suggested through which a uni-
versity might minimize its potential liability for libel in its student 
publications. 
30. In dissenting opinions both Justice Harlan and Justice Marshall, with whom 
Justice Stewart concurred, agreed that proof of actual damages and some degree of 
negligence was the appropriate standard. 403 U.S. at 66, 68-69, 86-87. The dissenting 
opinions differed on the question of punitive damages, however. Justice Harlan would 
allow punitive damages where they "bear a reasonable and purposeful relationship to 
the actual harm done ••• and the plaintiff has proved the speaker acted out of express 
malice •••• " 403 U.S. at 77. Justice Marshall would eliminate the recovery of punitive 
damages entirely in defamation suits against the press. 403 U.S. at 83-86. 
31. For a thoughtful discussion of Rosenbloom and the developments in this area, 
see Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from 
Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1547 
(1972). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 518-44 (1970); 
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 
SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 267; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Mean-
ing of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 191; Wright, Defamation, Privacy and 
the Public's Right To Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. 
R.Ev. 630 (1968). 
32. This Note assumes that the plaintiff can overcome the doctrines of charitable and 
sovereign immunity. See generally W. PROSSER, LA.w OF TORTS§§ 131, 133 (4th ed. 1971); 
Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 480 (1971). The relative importance of the immunity problem is 
declining inasmuch as the trend is toward the elimination of these doctrines. See W. 
PROSSER, supra, § 133; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 
1966 U. !LI.. L.F. 919. 
33. While this Note specifically examines defamatory material in student newspapers, 
the general concepts should be applicable to other university-sponsored student publica-
tions. 
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II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
By the beginning of this century it was generally recognized that 
a publisher would be held strictly liable for defamatory matter ap-
pearing in his newspaper,34 even when inserted without his knowl-
edge85 or against his instructions.36 Liability was imposed not only 
when the publisher or owner was an individual actively engaged in 
the business, but also when the newspaper was a corporation.87 But 
these decisions all dealt with commercial, not student, newspapers. 
It is therefore necessary to determine whether the various theories 
of liability used to reach a commercial publisher are sufficient to sus-
tain an action against a university for libelous matter printed in a 
student publication. Two theories, which will be referred to as vicari-
ous liability and communication liability, will be considered. 
A. Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability-also known as respondeat superior, imputed 
liability, and enterprise liability-is a doctrine which imposes respon-
sibility upon one person or entity for the torts of another because of 
the relationship between them.38 While the origins of the doctrine 
are obscure and its rationale has been much debated,39 vicarious lia-
bility is generally justified today by the enterprise concept.40 This 
justification, however, does not identify precisely when vicarious lia-
bility will be imposed.41 
34. Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal 262, 40 P. 392 (1895); Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis. 133, 65 
N.W. 744 (1896). 
35. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152 (1871); Crane v. Bennet, 177 N.Y. 106, 69 N.E. 274 
(1904). 
36. Dunn v. Hall, 1 Ind. 344 (1849); Perret v. New Orleans Times, 25 La. Ann. 170, 
173 (1873) (dictum). See Annot., 15 Am. St. R. 333 (1890). 
37. See, e.g., Sweet v. Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass. 450, 102 N.E. 660 (1913); Park 
v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888); Turton v. New York Re• 
corder Co., 144 N.Y. 144 (1894); World Publishing Co. v. Minahan, 70 Okla. 107, 173 P. 
815 (1913); Coffman v. Spokane Chronicle Publishing Co., 65 Wash. 1, 117 P. 596 (1911). 
38. 2 F. HARPER&: F. JAMES, Tm: I.Aw OF TORTS § 26.1 (1956); w. PROSSER, supra note 
32, § 69. 
39. See generally T. BATY, VICARIOUS LlAJIILITY (1916); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on 
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Holmes, Agency, 4 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 345 (1891); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923); Wig• 
more, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (pt. 2), 7 HARv. L. REv. 383 (1894). 
40. An enterprise is conceived as being endowed with three characteristics which 
make it a preferable loss bearer for torts caused by its employees. First, the enterprise 
is thought to be in the best position to foresee the risks created by its activity. There• 
fore, it is in the best position to minimize them. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Ad· 
ministration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 586-87 (1929). Second, by definition the enterprise 
deals in a market, Therefore, it can spread the burden of any losses among a mass au-
dience. Calabresi, supra note 39, at 517-19. Finally, it can reflect the loss as a cost of 
doing business, thereby facilitating a rational allocation of resources. Id. at 500-02. 
41. See Douglas, supra note 40, for a thoughtful analysis which has not yet been 
adopted in the case law. 
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One common test states that vicarious liability will be imposed 
upon (1) a principal for the torts of his agents, if, (2) the agent was 
acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority.42 This test 
provides a satisfactory framework for analyzing the student news-
paper-university relationship. 
I. The "Authority" Requirement 
To facilitate analysis the authority requirement will be examined 
first. Assuming, for the moment, that an agency relationship exists 
between the university, as principal, and its student newspaper, as 
agent, the problem is to determine the range of defamatory torts that 
are within the scope of the student authors' and editors' authority. 
Only in regard to these torts will the university be held liable. 
Several types of authority are commonly recognized. Authority 
vested in the agent by the principal is actual authority.43 It may be 
established by the principal's express instructions to the agent,44 or 
may be implied from the principal's instructions concerning the 
nature of the business undertaken, the time allotted to perform it, and 
custom or trade practice.45 In some cases, no actual authority is vested 
in the agent by the principal; only the appearance of authority is 
created through the principal's representations to others which sug-
gest an agent has authority.46 In these cases, the courts may vest 
authority in the agent to protect an innocent person.47 
Section 220(2) of the REsrATEMENT {SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957), which lists ten factors 
which courts have often considered in imposing vicarious liability, reflects the disarray 
of the case law. The factors are unweighted and their relevance is not explained. 
42. See, e.g., Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Owens, 207 S.W. 666 (1918); Ferson, · 
Agency To Make Representations, 2 VAND. L. R.Ev. I, 9-10 (1948). While this descriptive 
test often appears in the case law, the majority of courts use the terms "master," 
"servant," and "employment" in place of "principal," "agent," and "authority," as does 
the tort section (§§ 215-67) of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 41. This Note will use 
"principal" and "agent" rather than "master" and "servant" since the terminology is 
virtually synonymous. R. POWELL, THE LAw OF AGENCY 22-23 (2d ed. 1961). 
43. REsrAT.EM.ENT, supra note 41, § 7. 
44. Id. See also R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 38-46. 
45. REsrATEM.ENT, supra note 41, § 7. See also R. PoWELL, supra note 42, at 38-46. 
46. R.ESTATE.'\LENT, supra note 41, § 8. See also R. PowELL, supra note 42, at 56-68; 
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 8-B. 
47. REsrAT.E.'\IENT, supra note 41, § 265. See also Hetherington, Trends in Enterprise 
Liability: Law and the Unauthorized Agent, 19 STAN. L. R.Ev. 76 (1966); Comment, 
Agency-Recovery in Tort Under the Theory of Apparent Authority or Agency by 
Estoppel, 69 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 186 (1967). 
The difference between actual and apparent authority is derived from the flow of 
the principal's representations. In actual authority the flow is from principal to agent, 
while in apparent authority the flow is from the principal to the third party. 
In addition to actual and apparent authority, some commentators have conclud~d 
that there is another basis upon which authority can rest, sometimes called usual aria-_ 
thority or inherent agency. However, this basis of liability appears to be a blend of 
apparent and implied authority, most often found when the principal has seemingly 
created authority in an agent by appointing him to a position recognized in the com-
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Three examples illustrate the application of these principles in the 
student newspaper-university context. The first example is that of a 
student reporter who, in good faith, has inaccurately reported a story, 
thereby libeling an innocent person.48 The reporter has engaged in 
conduct required by his agency and also has followed the express 
guidelines of the newspaper by attempting to check the facts for 
accuracy. No one could dispute that the inaccurate story was within 
the reporter's actual authority. 
The second example is that of a student reporter who has written 
a story using inaccurate, unverified data while rushing to meet a 
deadline.49 The reporter has violated the student newspaper rules 
concerning verification, but was motivated by the need to give the 
principal the benefit of the story. It is submitted that the reporter was 
impliedly authorized to violate the rules since the principal should 
anticipate that the reporter would not refrain from acts that appear 
natural under the circumstances. 50 
In each example above, liability would not likely be imposed 
upon the author, the editors, the student newspaper, or the university 
if the statements fell within the ambit of New York Times.51 Clearly, 
there is no actual malice in the first case. Nor is malice likely in the 
second example; the Court has indicated that the failure to verify 
all the facts in a "hot news" item should not be considered malice.52 
The third example, that of a libelous story written by a reporter 
or editor out of personal malice, presents no problem under the New 
York Times doctrine, but raises a more difficult problem in terms of 
the agency analysis. While the reporter has no actual authority, the 
principal should be liable for the defamation because the objective 
facts create an appearance that the story was within the writer's 
authority.53 To the statements· of the reporter are added the weight 
munity as carrying certain powers to bind his principal, and thus does not merit sepa-
rate discussion. See R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 41-53; R.EsrATEMENT, supra, § 8-A. 
48. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra. 
49. See text accompanying note 26 supra. 
50. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mutual Bene.fit Health &: Accident Assn., 82 F.2d 115, 
120 (8th Cir. 1936); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 575-76, 30 
Cal. Rptr. 350, 359 (1963); Mercado v. Hoefler, 190 Cal. App. 2d 12, 11 Cal. Rptr. 787, 
790 (1961). 
"A master cannot direct a servant to accomplish a result and anticipate that he will 
always use the means which he (the master) directs or will refrain from acts which it is 
natural to expect that servants may do." REsrATEMENT, supra note 41, § 230, Comment b. 
51. See notes 22-30 supra and accompanying text. 
52. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153-54, 158-59 (1967). 
53. See Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950), where a 
reporter intentionally and falsely reported that a local official had been charged with 
criminal conduct by a witness in a case. The official sued the newspaper, which defended 
by arguing that it was not liable for the story because the reporter's personal vendetta 
was outside the scope of his authority. The court rejected this argument, concluding that 
the newspaper appeared to vest the reporter with authority, even though he actually 
did not have it. 
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of the reputation of the student newspaper and, further, the univer-
sity itself.154 
These examples illustrate the spectrum of possible defamatory 
situations. At one end is the unavoidable mistake, at the other, the 
intentional libel. The conclusion can be drawn that every libelous 
article written by an agent for publication in the newspaper falls 
within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority. At this 
point the earlier assumption of an agency between the student news-
paper and the university must be considered. 
2. The Agency Requirement 
a. The traditional test for agency. If vicarious liability is to be 
imposed upon the university for libel in student newspapers, an 
agency relationship must be established. Agency is defined as "the 
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by 
one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."155 This 
definition implies a three pronged test: consent, benefit, and the right 
of control. 
Consent is measured by an objective standard.156 When a news-
paper has official status as a student organization, it seems clear that 
a consensual relationship with the university exists. Even when a 
student newspaper does not have such official status, the university 
and the newspaper may manifest consent informally through con-
duct.157 At least where the university in fact exercises some form of 
control over the paper, it should be held that a consensual relation-
ship exists. 
The benefit requirement arises from the notion that the agent 
acts on behalf of the principal.158 Since agency is usually associated 
with business carried on for profit, the principal typically expects to 
benefit financially by entering into the relationship.159 Far less tangible 
benefits, however, are sufficient to support an agency relationship. 
Domestic servants60 or gratuitous helpers61 usually provide benefits of 
a nonfinancial character, yet their actions may give rise to vicarious 
liability. 
54. R.EsrATEMENT, supra note 41, § 247, Comment c. See also id. §§ 165, 254, 265. 
55. R.EsrATEMENT, supra note 41, § 1. 
56. Id. § 1, Comment b. 
57. See, e.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Heims v. Hanke, 
5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W .2d 455 (1958). See also R.EsrATEMENT, supra note 41, §§ 1, 15. 
58. See Mitchell v. Resto, 157 Conn. 258, 253 A.2d 25 (1968); Weatherman v. Ram-
sey, 207 N.C. 270, 176 S.E. 568 (1934). See also R.EsrATEMENT, supra note 41, §§ 1, 14, 
14A-M. 
59. Cf. R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 1-4. 
60. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § I, Comments d, e, § 220, Comments a, c. 
61. See Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 
2d 465, 93 N.W .2d 455 (1958). 
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A university could conceivably derive three types of benefits from 
a student newspaper: financial, educational, and informational. But 
the likelihood of obtaining financial benefits is small. Most student 
newspapers are not profit-making enterprises and the university must 
provide funds for their operation. 62 Of more practical importance are 
the educational benefits that the university receives by publishing a 
student newspaper. These benefits are obvious when the newspaper 
is used as a teaching device integrated into the curriculum, but also 
arise from extracurricular student newspapers. Even where the news-
paper is hostile to the administration, a university receives a benefit 
through the development of students who can think perceptively 
and critically. A newspaper that serves as a forum for debate and 
discussion facilitates an atmosphere of intellectual freedom and en-
hances the vitality of the university community. Finally, a student 
newspaper benefits the university by disseminating information of 
particular concern to the university community. 
While a finding of benefit is necessary to establish the agency 
requirement, it is not sufficient. Other relationships, such as buyer-
seller or stockholder-corporation, can be characterized to include 
benefits similar to those created through an agency. 63 Therefore, 
courts also require the presence of the control element. Early formu-
lations of this requirement centered around the principal's actual 
control over the agent's physical movements, even though a principal 
who employed more than one agent could not always be in physical 
control of each agent's conduct.64 The leading case of Singer Manu-
facturing Co. v. Rahn65 changed the emphasis from the principal's 
actual control to his "right to direct the manner in which the business 
shall be done as well as the result to be accomplished."66 But that case 
still clung to the concept that the principal must be able to direct the 
agent's physical conduct. This concept proved inadequate since 
principals often employ agents with special skills lacked by the prin-
cipal. A test that did not require control over the details of physical 
conduct was needed. The concept of "enterprise control" has an-
swered that need: some courts and commentators have viewed control 
in terms of the right to make management and policy decisions. 67 
62. Over seventy-five per cent of the student newspapers responding to an informal 
survey by the Review reported receiving a subsidy from the sponsoring university, either 
in the form of activity fees or through general revenues. See Appendix infra. 
63. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 41, §§ 14A-M. 
64. See Kahn-Freund, Servants and Independent Contractors, 14 MODERN L. R.Ev. 
504 (1951). Cf. R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 16-19. 
65. 132 U.S. 518 (1889). 
66. 132 U.S. at 523. 
67. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); 
Douglas, supra note 40, at 586-87. Cf. Peterson v. Brinn & Jensen Co., 134 Neb. 909, 280 
N.W. 171 (1938); R. POWELL, supra note 42, at 16-19; Kahn-Freund, supra note 64, at 
506-07. 
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Under this view, a principal has control over an agent whenever 
the former can direct the latter to employ his skills to accomplish a 
certain result; the principal is not required to direct the agent in the 
details of his task. 
Two control mechanisms are likely to be present in this situation. 
The first is the university's power over the student newspaper's 
finances. Universities have typically supported student newspapers by 
providing revenue and donating such items as office space, equipment, 
supplies and a substantial range of services from budget planning to 
duplication/18 In return for providing financial support a university 
will frequently require the student newspaper to submit all its con-
tracts to the university for approval.69 Thus, the university, through 
its financial power, has established control over the student news-
paper, 70 since it cannot function without the university's approval. 
Another important, but less obvious, means of establishing control 
over the student newspaper is through the university's inherent power 
to operate or regulate activities associated with it.71 A student news-
paper can be differentiated from any other distributed on campus-
from the New York Times to an underground newspaper-when it 
has the status of an official student organization.72 In this situation, 
the university could promulgate regulations, enforceable under threat 
of termination of the official status of the student newspaper, imposing 
its own conceptions of managerial and, in some instances, editorial 
policy.73 
Even an unexercised power should be sufficient to establish the 
university's right of control. In Rubtchinsky v. State University of 
68. Over ninety per cent of the student newspapers answering the Review survey 
reported that they received some support of this type from the university. See Appendix 
infra. 
69. See, e.g., Purdue Exponent Review Board Report, App. VI-B, at 5 (1969). Al-
though university attorneys who participated in the Review survey were not specifically 
asked about retention of contract approval power, over one half indicated that the uni-
versity retained this type of power. See Appendix infra. 
70. See Purdue Review Board, supra note 69, App. VI-B, at 5-9. 
71. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972), quoting Esteban v. Central Missouri 
State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970): "'We 
• • • hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and regulations; 
that it has inherent power properly to discipline; that it has power appropriately to 
protect itself and its property, that it may expect that its students adhere to generally 
accepted standards of conduct.' " In his concurring opinion in Healy Chief Justice 
Burger noted: 
I read the basis of the remand as recognizing that student organizations seeking 
the privilege of official campus recognition must be willing to abide by valid rules 
of the institution applicable to all such organizations. This is a reasonable condi-
tion insofar as it calls for the disavowal of resort to force, disruption, and inter-
ference with the rights of others. 
408 U.S. at 195. See generally Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Au-
thority To Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis, 117 
U. PA. L. REV. 373 (1969). 
72. See note 10 supra. 
73. See note 71 supra. 
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New Y ork74 a suit was filed against the university by the parents of an 
eighteen-year-old student injured while participating in an activity 
sponsored by the Campus Student Association. The university argued 
that the Student Association had planned the whole activity and 
operated as "a separate and distinct entity ... from the college."76 
Noting, however, that under the constitution of the Student Associa-
tion the president of the university had full veto power over the 
activity, the court found the university in sufficient control of the 
activity to justify the imposition of liability.76 The relationship be-
tween the Student Association and the University was found to be 
"consonant with the effort to grant college students as much auton-
omy as possible in their extracurricular activities while still retaining 
final control in the hands of adult authority."77 The retention of 
ultimate control, whether exercised or not, was sufficient for vicarious 
liability purposes. 78 
The relationship between the university and its student newspaper 
varies greatly from school to school; thus, the significance of the forms 
of control discussed above can be more fully understood when viewed 
in the context of specific fact situations. Because the vast majority of 
student newspapers are unincorporated associations,79 their variations 
will be set forth first, through the use of four models that illustrate a 
range of student newspaper-university relationships. Then, the special 
significance of independent incorporation will be examined. 
Model A typifies unincorporated student newspapers that are 
operated by the university as part of the curriculum. The newspaper 
is operated by the journalism department as a training device for 
journalism students and there is supervision by faculty members 
who read and pass upon the acceptability of articles. The university 
also provides the newspaper with operating revenue, facilities, sup-
plies, and services. In addition, the university retains the power to 
approve all newspaper contracts. In short, the university exercises 
virtually complete control over the student newspaper. 
74. 46 Misc. 2d 679, 260 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Ct. CI. 1965). 
75. 46 Misc. 2d at 681, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 258. 
76. However, since the court also found that the university had not violated any duty 
owed to the student, liability was not imposed. 
77. 46 Misc. 2d at 681, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 259. 
78. The legal advisors of a student-faculty committee appointed to examine the 
relationship between Purdue University and its student newspaper and to recommend 
changes concluded that the university had control over the publication even though the 
constitution of the newspaper purported to keep editorial authority solely in the stu-
dent editor. They based this conclusion on the university's inherent power over stu-
dent organizations: 
Since the constitution [of the student newspaper] was conditional upon approval 
of the University and since the University reserves the right to revise it, the con-
stitution itself is an indication the ultimate power rests with the University, although 
it has seen fit to delegate terminable editorial authority to the student organization. 
Purdue Review Board, supra note 69, App. VI-B, at 13. See also id. at 2-17. 
79. See Appendix infra. 
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In model B the university dominates the unincorporated news-
paper's financial structure and has retained contract-approval power 
in return for its financial aid.80 But in this model the student editors 
have complete editorial freedom, and the university disclaims any 
intent to control editorial policy. Nevertheless, the contract-approval 
power gives the university the right of control. Moreover, the uni-
versity may also have such a right through its inherent power if the 
newspaper is an official student organization. The essential difference 
between this model and model A is in the amount of discretion 
given to students. Yet, the greater discretion given to the students in 
model B could be withdrawn at any time. The right of control exists 
even though the university disclaims it.81 
Model C presents a more difficult situation for concluding that 
the university controls the unincorporated student newspaper. In 
this model the university does not provide the newspaper with any 
financial support or technical assistance. Moreover, the university 
does not exercise any actual managerial or editorial control, nor even 
approve the newspaper's contracts. The only significant contact be-
tween the university and the student newspaper is the paper's status 
as an official student organization. However, even this sole contact 
may be sufficient to establish the university's control. The student 
newspaper's official status should give the university the inherent 
power to make and enforce regulations dictating managerial and 
editorial policies. 
Model D assumes the same facts as model C except that the news-
paper is not an official student organization. In this case there is no 
ground for concluding that the control requirement is met. 
These models illustrate the range of student newspaper-univer-
sity relationships, from virtual identity to no contacts at all. In each 
case, except for model D, a court could conclude that vicarious liabil-
ity should be imposed. The benefits necessary to establish the uni-
versity as a principal consist of the various educational and informa-
tional benefits that the university derives.82 Control sufficient to meet 
either the Singer test83 or the enterprise test84 is also present. In each 
of the first three models the university, through the use of the finan-
cial or inherent power mechanisms, could either completely direct 
the details of the editors' and staff's employment or, alternatively, 
take over the policy-making function. Thus, the fulfillment of both 
the agency requirement and the authority requirement, discussed 
80. Over one half of the university attorneys answering the Review survey reported 
that their university's relationship to the student newspaper was similar to the one de-
scribed by this model. See Appendix infra. 
81. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra. 
82. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra. 
83. See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra. 
84. See notes 67 supra and accompanying text. 
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above,85 together suggest that universities generally should expect 
to be held vicariously liable for defamatory material in unincorpo-
rated student publications. 
However, when a student newspaper is independently incorpo-
rated a significant new element is added to the calculus of values that 
bear on the vicarious liability problem. Given that incorporation is 
viewed generally as a means of limiting liability, does the indepen-
dent incorporation of a student newspaper obstruct the imposition of 
vicarious liability upon the university? 
When the American Association of University Professors pub-
lished its Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students86 it 
stated: "The student press should be free from censorship and ad-
vance approval of copy, and its editors and managers should be free 
to develop their own editorial policies and news coverage."87 The 
Joint Statement concluded that the best means of achieving this 
objective would be through "an independent corporation financially 
and legally separate from the university."88 In addition to the concern 
for promoting editorial freedom, another reason for separate incor-
poration was that "[w]here financial and legal autonomy is not possi-
ble, the institution, as the publisher of student publications, may 
have to bear the legal responsibility for the contents of the publica-
tions." The clear inference from this statement is that if the news-
paper is legally and financially autonomous the university will be 
insulated from liability. However, even where a student newspaper 
is separately incorporated financial independence is not likely to be 
achieved.89 Large independently incorporated student newspapers 
may enjoy the luxury of university aid90 and depend upon its exis-
tence.91 The possibility of incorporation coexisting with some form of 
dependence raises several questions. If a newspaper is legally separate 
but financially dependent upon the university, will a court ignore the 
legal barrier and hold the university vicariously liable? In the absence 
of financial dependence, would an independent corporation that was 
an official student organization provide a sufficient basis for imposing 
vicarious liability on the grounds suggested above, that the university 
has an inherent power over its student activities? 
It is suggested that when consent and benefit are present, control 
85. See notes 43-54 supra and accompanying text. 
86. 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 258 (1968). 
87. Id. at 260. 
88. Id. 
89. See Appendix infra, 
90. The University of Michigan purchases 1800 subscriptions for faculty and staff. 
Purdue Review Board, supra note 69, App. II-G. 
91. Henry Grix, a 1969 Daily editor, noted in a letter to C. Michael Abbott that 
"[i]n fact the one threat the University can make is to make us totally independent; 
there ·is a good chance we would quickly go broke." Abbott, supra note 13, at 14 n.44. 
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should be analyzed in terms of the mechanisms set forth earlier, with-
out regard to the actor's corporate status. Since the realities of control, 
rather than mere considerations of form, appear most important, the 
university should be liable whether or not the student newspaper is 
incorporated in situations equivalent to models A, B, and C above. 
However, the problem may not be merely one of form versus sub-
stance. The corporate form carries with it a privilege of limited 
liability, disregarded only in rare circumstances.92 There is, indeed, 
authority that the traditional rules of agency will be relaxed when 
considering whether a subsidiary corporation is an agent of its par-
ent.03 Thus the fact of incorporation itself may militate against find-
ing vicarious liability. Regardless of how the issue is determined in 
this context, there will often be consent, benefit, and control sufficient 
to justify the imposition of vicarious liability upon the university for 
defamation published in its student newspaper. 
b. Constitutional limitations upon a university's control of a 
student newspaper: vicarious liability reconsidered. As evidenced by 
New York Times and its progeny, the first amendment plays a signif-
icant role in the synthesis of the substantive law of libel. But the first 
amendment may affect not only the determination of primary liability 
but also the ability of the university to control effectively the opera-
92. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. 
Wis. 1905). However, a court might "pierce the corporate veil" where an incorporated 
student newspaper is involved, thereby either refusing to recognize the newspaper and 
university as separate entities or, to the e.xtent that the newspaper is a principal share-
holder, refusing to recognize the separation between the corporation and its share-
holders. While a detailed analysis of this problem is beyond the scope of this Note, 
several observations can be made. The courts will pierce the corporate veil only when 
they perceive some fundamental unfairness in maintaining separation. See Bartle v. 
Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955). Factors 
that are often cited include a disregard for the formalities of corporate existence, a 
commingling of affairs, or thin capitalization. See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 
(1961). But see Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 
(1966). See generally Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 979, 994-98 
(1971). However, because the case law arises in a commercial setting, any analogy to the 
university-student newspaper context must be drawn with caution. 
Nevertheless, the unive1-sity can minimize whatever risk of piercing exists by adopt-
ing several measures. First, the formalities of corporate separation should be rigorously 
adhered to in forming the student newspaper corporation and in carrying on its busi-
ness. See Douglas &: Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 
39 YALE L.J. 193, 196-97 (1929); Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the 
Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1193-94 (1967). 
Second, the student newspaper should be operated in a fair manner considering the 
risk of a libel action. For e.xample, if the newspaper's assets are small, profits or oper-
ating funds should be allocated to the purchase of insurance before paying salaries to 
student editors and managers. Third, the separation of the newspaper and the university 
should be emphasized to the public by a disclaimer stating that the views of the news-
paper are not necessarily those of the university. Further, a statement of purposes in 
the corporate charter should include separateness of editorial control, if appropriate. 
93. F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 92-93 (1931). See Berkey v. 
Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). 
1076 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1061 
tion of a student newspaper. Where first amendment considerations 
are applicable, the question whether the university meets the. control 
requirement for agency must be reconsidered. This section will 
examine the extent to which the first amendment limits the uni-
versity's control over the publication of libel in student newspapers 
as well as the implications of these limitations on the imposition of 
vicarious liability. 
Although one of the most significant types of control that the uni-
versity could exercise over a student newspaper would be control 
over its editorial policy, recent judicial recognition of the first amend-
ment rights of students suggests that there may be important constitu-
tional limitations on the extent of such control. By the terms of both 
the first and fourteenth amendments, freedom of speech and the press 
are protected against interference from governmental or "state ac-
tion.''94 There is certainly no difficulty in .finding "state action" 
where a state university is concerned.95 But whether state action 
can be found in the private university for first amendment purposes 
is a largely unanswered question. The various state action theories, 
which have developed in other contexts and for other purposes, might 
be applied to the private university for first amendment purposes.96 
94. See generally P. KAUl'ER, CmL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 127-66 (1962); 
Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and 
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Lewis, The Meaning of State 
Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1458 (1960); Van Alstyne &: Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L, 
REv. 3 (1961). 
95. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 170 (1972); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. 
Supp. 1329 (1970). 
96. For an analysis of the potential presence of state action in the private university, 
see H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA 
(1969); O'Neill, supra note 1; Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24 
RUTGERS L. REv. 323 (1970); Developments, supra note 3, at 1154-63. 
Recognizing that a clear private-public distinction is rarely present in our modern 
institutions and enterprises the Court has declared that a "sifting [of] facts and weigh-
ing [of] circumstances" is necessary to determine whether the state is "significantly in-
volved" in what might appear to be private activity. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 
U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972). Thus, in determining whether sufficient state action is present 
in a private university, a court would consider the wide variety of factors that it has 
examined in previous cases including state financial assistance through direct grants, 
scholarships, and tax exemptions, the participation of state officials in the administra-
tion of the private university, the degree of state regulation of the university through 
accreditation, attendance, diploma or employment Tequirements, as well as the extent 
to which the private university performs a public function by providing educational 
opportunities which the state might otherwise have to supply. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mul-
key, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Griffin v. County School 
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); 
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957), for the various criteria of state 
action. One district court found state action to be present in a major private university, 
based on a combination of the factors cited above, but the holding was reversed at a 
new trial. Guillery v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), 
vacated, 207 F. Supp. 554, afjd. & remanded per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), revd. on 
retrial, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). It is unlikely that any one of these factors by 
itself would be sufficient; rather a combination of all of the factors, each heavily 
weighted toward state control, would probably be necessary in order to support a find-
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But given our society's traditional respect for the independence of the 
private university,97 it is unlikely that the courts would be inclined 
to find "state action" in this situation. The constitutional limitations 
on editorial control are probably applicable only to state universities. 
An examination of these limitations should begin with Tinker v. 
Des A1oines Independent Community School District98 in which the 
Supreme Court held that the first amendment prohibited a high 
school from disciplining students for wearing black arm bands as a 
protest against the Vietnam War. The Court declared that "[i]t can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.''99 However, restrictions could be imposed upon a student's 
freedom of expression if "necessary to avoid material and substantial 
interference with schoolwork or discipline .... "100 The Court has 
reaffirmed its commitment to protection of the first amendment rights 
of students in subsequent decisions.101 • 
Both before and after Tinker, a number of cases have arisen 
challenging editorial control over student newspapers at state univer-
sities.102 Most of these cases have involved censorship of alleged 
ing of state action in this context. See Moose Lodge No. 17 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), 
where the fact that a "private club" was subject to a certain amount of regulation by 
the state was not sufficient to support a finding of state action. 
Many of the Court's most expansive "state action" decisions have been in the area 
of racial discrimination, the historical target of the fourteenth amendment. It is ques-
tionable whether the Court would strive quite so hard to find state action in an osten-
sibly "private" institution when racial discrimination is not involved. 
A finding of state action would presumably subject the private university to a wide 
range of constitutional limitations. Thus a private university might think avice before 
defending against a libel claim by urging that because of the presence of state action 
it was unable to exercise "control'' over the student paper. 
97. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 96, at 12, 30. 
98. 393 U.S. 503 (1968). 
99. 393 U.S. at 506. 
100. 393 U.S. at 511. 
101. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators, 41 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S., April 12, 1973); 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy the Court observed that "the precedents 
of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for 
order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses 
than in the community at large." 408 U.S. at 180. 
102. Joyner v. Whiting, No. 72-1630 (4th Cir., April 10, 1973) (state college president 
may not cut off funds of the student newspaper because he disagrees with editorial views 
expressed, but the president may seek judicial relief against discriminatory practices by 
the paper); Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (once the student 
newspaper was open to commercial advertisements, the state university administration 
and student editorial board could not reject an advertisement due to its editorial con-
tent); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971) (state college's attempt to 
change student newspaper from a forum of student expression to instructional tool 
controlled by mass communications department was not done with sufficient clarity and 
notice to allow an exercise of restraint over student writing); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. 
Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) (state university officials could not restrain publication of a 
picture of a burning American flag on the cover of a student publication); Antonelli v. 
Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970) (faculty advisory board of a state college 
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obscenity103 or controversial political issues.104 While no reported case 
has squarely faced the issue of whether the university may exercise 
control to prevent the publication of defamatory material in a student 
paper, 105 no university has been able to establish its right to exercise 
editorial control over the student newspaper.106 
The "material and substantial disruption" test of Tinker evolved 
in the context of symbolic speech in the high school setting. Our 
society assumes a greater degree of maturity on the part of university 
students than high school students; the exercise of free expression is 
less likely to result in material and substantial disruption in the uni-
versity than in the high school.1°7 As a practical matter it will be 
student newspaper could not require student articles to be submitted for approval 
prior to publication); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. 
Ala. 1967) (state college administration could not prohibit the editor of student news-
paper from publishing material critical of the state legislature or suspend him from 
school for doing so); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 37 App. Div. 2d 987, 327 N.Y.S.2d 755 
(1971) (administration of state colleges may not prohibit "attacks on religion" in student 
newspapers). Although it concerned a high school newspaper, Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. 
Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (high school administration could not prohibit a student news-
paper from publishing a paid political advertisement where the paper had previously 
been used as a forum for free expression of ideas), has apparently been influential in the 
university newspaper cases. It should be noted that in all of these cases the courts 
addressed themselves to the individual facts at hand and did not explore the ultimate 
limits of the first amendment rights of students. Most of the courts acknowledged that 
the "material and substantial disruption" test of Tinker was applicable to the student 
press but concluded that the administration failed to establish any such disruption. 
See generally Trager, Freedom of the Press in College and High School, 35 ALBANY L. 
REv. 161 (1971). 
Questions concerning the first amendment rights of university students have recently 
arisen in other contexts as well. Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (1969), 
and Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (1969), invalidated university regulations 
prohibiting students from inviting certain types of individuals to speak on campus. 
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967), struck down 
university regulations which required prior approval of parades and demonstrations. 
103. See, e.g., Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970). 
104. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, No. 72-1630 (4th Cir., April 10, 1973); Lee v. Board 
of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 
F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967). 
105. In Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971), the faculty advisor of a 
state college student newspaper required the student editors to delete a seemingly mild 
editorial and the caption to an editorial cartoon from the paper on the grounds that 
they were potentially libelous. The court did not reach the question of whether the 
administration could censor "potentially libelous material" but did observe that 
[i]n the context of an educational institution, a prohibition on protected speech, 
to be valid, must be "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with 
schoolwork or discipline." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District .••• No such justification has been offered here. While Mr. McAvoy did 
suggest that he was concerned about libel, defendants made no effort to prove that 
plaintiff Trujillo's writings were libelous as a matter of Colorado law and also 
unentitled to first amendment protection as a matter of federal law. 
322 F. Supp. at 1270-71. 
106. See cases cited in note 102 supra. 
107. A number of cases interpreting the scope of Tinker at the high school level have 
concerned school regulations imposing prior submission and approval requirements on 
the distribution of literature (generally applied against underground newspapers) on the 
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seldom, if ever, that the courts will approve editorial restraints on a 
student newspaper imposed by a state university under the Tinker 
test. The degree of first amendment protection accorded the student 
press may well be as great as that accorded the commercial press. 
The most effective means by which a university could control the 
editorial policy of the student press would be through some form of 
regulation requiring prior approval of articles. Yet, such a require-
ment would appear to fall within Near v. Minnesota's108 famous ad-
monition that "liberty of the press, historically considered and taken 
up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not 
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship."109 
While the Court has observed that libel is not constitutionally pro-
tected speech, 110 this does not necessarily mean that prior restraints 
imposed upon the dissemination of libel are constitutionally accept-
able. Near itself suggests the contrary since the Court invalidated a 
statute aimed at enjoining the publication of a "malicious, scandalous 
and defamatory newspaper."111 Moreover, while the Near Court pro-
vided explicit exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine for material 
affecting the national security during the time of war, obscenity,112 
and material inciting acts of violence or urging the overthrow of gov-
emment, 113 no similar exception was created for libel. Moreover, the 
recent landmark case of New York Times v. United States114 bears 
witness to the Court's continuing disapproval of prior restraints on 
the press even where important national security interests may be at 
stake. So long as the defamation laws continue to exist, however, they 
high school premises. See, e.g., Fujishema v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 
1972); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of 
Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970). 
Because of the need for stricter discipline at the high school level as well as the possible 
differences between publishing and circulating material, these cases should not be 
considered controlling on the question of administration censorship over student news-
papers in the university context. 
108 283 U.S. 697 (1930). 
109. 283 U.S. at 716. 
While the doctrine of prior restraint is firmly established, the Court has never 
defined its contours with complete clarity. At its very least the doctrine means that 
"[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression [bears] a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1962). For a 
discussion of the various aspects of the doctrine see T. EMERSON, THE SYSI'EM OF FREE· 
DOM OF EXPRESSION 503-12 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW&: 
CoNTEMP, PROB. 648 (1955) [hereinafter Emerson, Prior Restraint]. See also Times Film 
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50-78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting), 78-84 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
110. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). 
111. 283 U.S. at 702. 
112. In Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441, 445 (1957), however, the Court 
suggested that the doctrine of prior restraint is applicable even in the area of obscenity. 
113. 283 U.S. at 716. 
114. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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provide a private remedy for libel, thereby minimizing the need for 
prior restraint. Prior restraint of the press as a means of preventing 
the dissemination of libel is contrary to the established policies of the 
first amendment.115 
Even if prior restraints on student newspapers were not per se 
invalid, it might be impossible to devise a system of prior review that 
would be constitutionally adequate from a procedural standpoint.116 
In the area of obscenity the Court has approved prior review of mo-
tion pictures,117 even though they qualify as speech under the first 
amendment.118 However, in Freedman v. Maryland119 the Court de-
clared that to withstand constitutional scrutiny such a system must 
comply with certain procedural requirements. First, the state must 
bear the burden of proof.120 Second, any advance submission require-
115. In Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1335-38 (D. Mass. 1970), the court 
applied the doctrine of prior restraint to invalidate a system under which a student 
newspaper was required to submit all material to a faculty committee for prior approval. 
It might be urged that an exception to the prior restraint doctrine should be made 
where the student press is involved on the ground that the potential for disruption of 
the academic community through the publication of libelous material would warrant 
some degree of prior review. But it is unlikely that libelous material in a student paper 
would be capable of wreaking havoc on the university community. As the court noted 
in Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 1336: 
Obscenity in a campus newspaper is not the type of occurrence apt to be signifi-
cantly disruptive of an orderly and disciplined educational process. • • • The 
university setting of college-age students being exposed to a wide range of intellec-
tual experience creates a relatively mature marketplace for the interchange of ideas 
so that the free speech clause of the First Amendment with its underlying assump-
tion that there is positive social value in an open forum seems particularly 
appropriate. 
Indeed, considering the current state of student activism, prior restraint of a student 
publication by the university might be more likely to cause a "material and substantial 
disruption" by triggering demonstrations, protests and classroom boycotts than prac-
tically anything that the paper could print. 
In regard to libel, the student press might be distinguished from the commercial 
press in terms of the relationship between editorial control and potential liability. The 
owners of a commercial newspaper (corporate considerations aside) who may be 
potentially liable for defamation judgments may impose as much prior restraint on 
their editorial staff as they feel necessary to protect themselves. Yet, the doctrine of 
prior restraint would appear to prohibit the university from exercising similar review 
over its staff although it might also be held liable for any defamation published. If it 
were possible to censor with precision then perhaps this argument would be entitled 
to greater consideration. But one of the rationales underlying prohibition of prior 
restraints is that censorship invariably tends toward excess. Emerson, Prior Restraint, 
supra note 109, at 656-59. If the university were allowed a right of prior approval to 
protect itself against liability for defamation, the inevitable result would be the suppres-
sion of a certain amount of nondefamatory material regardless of good faith on the 
university's part. The important first amendment values at stake should not be 
sacrificed to this end since the university is capable of protecting itself against liability 
through other means. 
116. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process,'' 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. !,_18 (1970). 
117. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
118. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 497 (1952). 
119. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
120. 380 U.S. at 58. 
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ment must not be administered so that a censor's adverse decision 
would carry practical finality.121 Third, the procedure must provide 
for a prompt judicial determination of the question.122 
If prior restraints were allowed for student newspapers, it is prob-
able that the Court would at least insist upon adherence to these 
procedural requirements.123 Yet, it is unlikely that they could be met 
where a newspaper is involved. The "immediacy" value of news arti-
cles and editorials is far greater than that of motion pictures. It would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to ensure judicial review promptly 
enough to protect the "newsworthiness" of the material in issue. As 
a practical matter, the university might not consider censorship worth 
the effort and expense when faced with the burden of proof in an 
official proceeding subject to judicial review. 
Even in the absence of prior restraint, the university might be 
able to exercise some degree of editorial control through subsequent 
disciplinary proceedings against the newspaper. Of course, the uni-
versity would run afoul of the first amendment if it attempted to 
discipline student editors simply because it disagreed with the content 
of published material.124 Moreover, to accord fourteenth amendment 
due process, the university would have to promulgate clear and rea-
sonable standards of conduct as well as provide constitutionally ac-
ceptable notice and hearing.125 In establishing standards of conduct 
which would regulate activity in the area of the first amendment, the 
university would need to be extremely precise in order to avoid 
foundering on the overbreadth126 or vagueness doctrines.127 Perhaps 
the university could validly discipline student editors for intentional 
and gross violations of the canons of journalistic ethics or for mali-
ciously publishing material which they knew to be false or for pub-
lishing a statement with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. 
While such a practice would constitute some degree of editorial con-
trol, it is a far cry from a procedure of prior approval under which no 
allegedly libelous material would ever see daylight. 
It must be concluded that the state university can exercise little 
editorial control over a student newspaper without colliding with the 
121. !180 U.S. at 58. 
122. !180 U.S. at 58-59. 
12!1. Antonelli v. Hammond, !108 F. Supp. 1329, 1!135 (D. Mass. 1970), applied the 
Freedman standards to censorship of a student newspaper. 
124. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-
09 (1968); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970). 
125. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of 
Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961). Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
126. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971). See also Note, The First Amendment 
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 844 (1971). 
127. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1963). See also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness 
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 67 (1960). 
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first amendment. Because the Supreme Court has not directly con-
fronted the issue, however, it would not be surprising to find that 
many state universities actually exercise a substantial degree of edi-
torial control over student publications whether they may constitu-
tionally do so or not. When such control exists in fact, it should be 
taken into consideration in determining control for vicarious liability 
purposes. Analysis may therefore focus on public universities that 
both do not in fact control and cannot constitutionally control the 
actions of student authors and editors leading to the publication of 
a libel. In regard to these universities, does the first amendment 
negate the earlier finding of agency and therefore vicarious liability? 
The courts have never clearly indicated how complete the prin-
cipal's domination must be under either the Singer text, consisting 
of the right to control the agent's physical movement, or the enter-
prise test, consisting of the right to make management and policy 
decisions. The application of Singer is uncertain because, although 
the university does not retain control over the editorial work, it still 
has the right to control many other details. Similarly, the result under 
the enterprise test cannot be precisely determined. The university 
no longer has the right to make managerial decisions in the area of 
editorial policy, which is most critical to libel; however, it retains the 
right to make other important policy decisions, for example, those 
concerning the newspaper's financial structure. Most importantly, the 
university surely always retains the right to determine whether to 
sponsor a student newspaper at all. In short, while the first amend-
ment may negate the most important aspect of the control relation-
ship between a university and its student newspaper, other aspects 
of the control relationship remain. Given the fluidity of the control 
tests, a court might properly reach whatever result it felt was just. 
The reasons for imposing liability upon the university for a stu-
dent newspaper's defamatory torts are founded upon the traditional 
justifications of vicarious liability. A fundamental consideration is 
the desire to compensate for the injury to the plaintiff's reputation. 
The plaintiff himself will usually be forced to absorb the loss unless 
the university provides compensation.128 In addition, the university 
is likely to have the most experience in evaluating and insuring 
against the risks of a libel action.129 It may also be able to self-insure 
or to lower the cost of libel insurance by purchasing it in a package 
covering all insurance needs.130 Moreover, the university may spread 
the costs of insurance, or a libel judgment, over the student body 
through higher tuition.131 
128. See text accompanying note 82 supra. 
129. See note 40 supra. 
130. See notes 147-51 infra and accompanying text. 
131. See note 40 supra. 
April 1973) Notes 1083 
The policy considerations against imposing vicarious liability 
arise from the application of the first amendment. ·when the univer-
sity is constitutionally forbidden from exerting control over the 
newspaper it seems unfair to impose liability upon it: The university 
cannot take preventive action against the publication of the libel 
except in the most limited sense of closing the newspaper down.132 
A second major consideration is that the imposition of vicarious lia-
bility upon the university may ultimately be detrimental to the 
student press. If a university could be held vicariously liable even 
though virtually powerless to prevent the publication of libel, the 
consequences for student newspapers could be onerous. Concern for 
the burden of a libel action might cause the university to place limits 
upon or even to eliminate student newspapers. The essence of the 
controversy, then, can be reduced to one of balancing the importance 
of compensation against considerations of fairness to the university 
and the potential adverse effect on the student press. The plaintiff's 
interest in being compensated for the injury to his reputation should 
yield to the protection of the press and the facilitation of the free 
exchange of ideas. 
Public universities that do not exercise editorial control over stu-
dent publications should not be held vicariously liable for defamatory 
material appearing in those student publications. Vicarious liability 
should, however, be imposed generally upon both the public univer-
sities that in fact exercise editorial control and upon all private uni-
versities which, free of the first amendment limitation, have a right to 
control their student publications, whether it is exercised or not. 
B. Communication Liability 
Communication liability is based on the peculiar nature of def-
amation. Neither l~bel nor slander are actionable unless they are 
communicated to others,313 a process referred to as publication.134 
In view of the critical importance of publication, liability has been 
extended beyond the author to include those who communicated, or 
cooperated in communicating, defamatory statements.135 Communi-
cation liability is a form of personal rather than vicarious liability. 
Some form of direct participation by the university in the publication 
of the libel is necessary. Arguably, the university becomes a coopera-
1!12. However, its decision not to sponsor the student newspaper may not be based 
on its opposition to the editorial policy. Joyner v. Whiting, Civil No. 72-1630 (4th Cir., 
April 10, 1973). See notes 98-115 supra and accompanying text. 
133. The communication need not be made to a mass audience. Communication of 
a libel to one other person has been deemed actionable. Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 
175 N.E. 505, 244 N.Y.S. 28 (1931). 
134. 1 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, supra note 38, § 5.15 (1956). 
135. Grinnell v. Cable-Nelson Piano Co., 169 Mich. 183, 191, 135 N.W. 92, 95 (1912). 
See also Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 218-19, 47 N.E. 265, 266 (1897). 
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tive participant in the publication of the libel whenever it aids the 
student newspaper by providing various forms of financial aid.136 
Communication liability may be applicable where vicarious lia-
bility is not. For example, in La Barge v. Daily Orange,187 a $938,000 
libel action was filed against Syracuse University, its unincorporated 
student newspaper, the author, editors, and financial advisor. Syra-
cuse University moved for dismissal as to itself, arguing that the only 
basis for liability was respondeat superior, and that the doctrine was 
unavailable since the master-servant relationship between the uni-
versity and the student editors was absent.138 The court rejected the 
contention that vicarious liability was the only appropriate theory, 
holding: 
The label on the relationship-whether they are principal and agent, 
employer and employee or fellow actors-is immaterial. "He who 
furnishes the means of convenient circulation, knowing, or having 
reasonable cause to believe, that it is to be used for that purpose, if 
it is in fact so used, is guilty of aiding in the publication and becomes 
the instrument of the libeler.''139 
While the case was ultimately dismissed for failure to prosecute,140 it 
indicates at least one court's willingness to adopt the theory of com-
munication liability in a libel case involving a student newspaper. 
However, several barriers may obstruct the development of com-
munication liability as a viable theory in the university-student news-
paper context. First, it is unclear how much participation is required 
to impose liability upon the university. At least where the newspaper 
is a forum protected by the first amendment, the university cannot 
control editorial policy and is reduced to the role of a passive supplier 
of services, much like an ordinary commercial supplier or a charitable 
donor. Second, while communication liability does not allow, in the 
absence of privilege, the defendant's good intentions or lack of negli-
gence in publishing the libel to serve as a defense, this strictness has 
136. The informal survey conducted by th~ Review revealed that over ninety per cent 
of the student publications received some form of aid and assistance from their schools. 
See Appendix infra for a :i;rercentage breakdown of the form of assistance received. 
137. Civil No. 70-6597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 5th Dist., April 8, 1972) (dismissed for failure 
to prosecute). 
138. Brief for Syracuse University in support of Motion To Dismiss at 2-17, La 
Barge v. Syracuse Univ. 
139. La Barge v. Daily Orange, Opinion of March 4, 1971, denying defendant's, 
Syracuse University, motion to dismiss at 6, quoting Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 
218-19, 47 N.E. 265, 266 (1897). 
140. Subsequent to the denial of Syracuse University's motion to dismiss, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See 
text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. In light of this and plaintiff's failure to proceed 
with preliminary examinations, the suit was summarily dismissed. Renewed Motion To 
Dismiss by Syracuse University (April 8, 1972); letter from Attorneys for Syracuse Uni-
versity to Michigan Law Review, Nov. 21, 1972. 
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been relaxed for some secondary disseminators of libel. Those who 
are merely outlets for mass communication journals, and who really 
have little control over the editorial process, may avoid liability by 
proving that they did not know, and were not negligent in failing 
to discover, the libel contained in the journals.141 Where the univer-
sity is prohibited by the first amendment from the exercise of edito-
rial control, perhaps it, too, should be entitled to the same defense 
based on the absence of negligence. 
Finally, the utility of the communication liability theory, in re-
gard to both public and private universities, is significantly limited 
by the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan privilege of nonmalicious 
reporting.142 Since communication liability is imposed upon the uni-
versity because of its own actions as a participant in the publication 
of the libel, it might be expected that actual malice on the univer-
sity's part148 would have to be shown if the statement fell within the 
ambit of New York Times. In comparison, vicarious liability would 
not require a showing of actual malice on the university's part. 
Rather, the plaintiff would only be required to show that the author 
harbored malice, for that malice would be imputed to the university 
as principal.144 A showing that the university itself maliciously par-
ticipated in the publication of the libel would be unlikely. At the 
very least it would require proof that the university entertained seri-
ous doubts about the truth of material being printed in the news-
paper.145 
III. CONCLUSION: PLANNING To MINIMIZE LIABILITY 
This Note has examined the traditional theories that might give 
rise to a university's liability for defamatory material published in its 
student newspaper. Clearly, the threat of liability is cause for some 
concern among university administrators. Therefore, it is worth ex-
ploring several planning devices that could be used to minimize or 
eliminate a university's liability. 
As was discussed above,146 separate incorporation of the student 
newspaper will provide only an uncertain measure of protection for 
141. Hartmann v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1948); Albi v. Street &: 
Smith Publications, 140 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1944); Bowerman v. Detroit Free Press, 287 
Mich. 443, 283 N.W. 642 (1939); Balabanoff v. Fossani, 192 Misc. 615, 81 N.Y.S.2d 732 
(Sup. Ct. 1948). 
142. See notes 22-30 supra and accompanying text. 
143. This would, of course, require a showing of malice on the part of some agent of 
the university who was either actually or apparently authorized to exercise some form of 
supervision or control over the newspaper or authorized to represent the university to 
the public since a university could only act through its agents. 
144. See, e.g., Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 334, 60 S.E.2d 802, 813 
(1950). See generally Rl:sTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 272. 
145. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
146. See notes 85-93 supra and accompanying text. 
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the university. The surest device for minimizing the risk of university 
liability is insurance against libel. This is already a popular form of 
protection; over fifty per cent of schools answering the Review survey 
carried some form of libel insurance.147 As Professor Calabresi has 
pointed out, part of the justification for vicarious liability derives from 
the idea that "the master is the best insurer, both in the sense of being 
able to obtain insurance at the lower rates and· in the sense of being 
most aware of the risk."148 Insurance can minimize risk of liability 
without altering the relationship between the university and the stu-
dent publication. A disadvantage of insurance, especially for the 
smaller private college, is cost,149 which may become an important 
factor during these times of rapidly increasing costs of education, ris-
ing tuition, and shrinking enrollment.150 Libel insurance also may not 
cover punitive damages.151 Yet, while insurance may be sufficient 
from the university's point of view, it has one serious deficiency: it 
is not preventive. Insurance does nothing to correct problems in per-
sonnel or procedure that led to publication of a libel. 
Generally, the college campus functions an an enclave for the free 
interchange of ideas and opinions; in a real sense the campus is so-
ciety's outpost of reason. It is fitting that student newspapers be given 
a large measure of independence. However, the student editors and 
staff must understand not only the rights but also the responsibilities 
of carrying on a free press. The students should understand what a 
libel is, what their liability is for defamation, and what they can do 
to prevent it. To achieve this goal the university should invite jour-
nalists to conduct seminars on professional responsibility.1152 More-
over, the student newspaper and the university should develop in-
formal procedures for dealing with potentially libelous material. For 
example, at the University of Michigan, if the Michigan Daily editors 
believe material to be potentially libelous, they consult either a law 
professor or another attorney and discuss it. The procedure is in-
formal, and the student editors make the ultimate decision as to 
publication.153 
147. See Appendix infra. 
148. Calabresi, supra note 39, at 543. 
149. For example, the cost of insurance against liability for libel, invasion of privacy, 
and similar torts for a :tvfidwest newspaper with a circulation of 10,000 and a "good 
record" is 700 dollars annually (2,500 dollars deductible, 300,000 dollars maximum 
coverage). Figures provided by Mindus & Mindus, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
150. See Recession Hits the Colleges, NEWSWEEK, March 23, 1971, at 63. 
151. One university attorney responding to the Review survey noted that the uni-
versity's insurance policy would not cover punitive damages. 
152. See generally Nelson, Newsmen and the Times Doctrine, 12 VILL. L. REv. 738 
(1967); McLeod & Hawley, Professionalization Among Newsmen, 41 JOURNALISM Q. 
529 (1964). 
153. Conversation with Professor Berlin, Chairman, Board of Student Publications, 
University of Michigan, Oct. 15, 1972. 
April 1973] Notes 1087 
Such measures require a high degree of good faith both by stu-
dents and administration. But that is not inconsistent with the adult 
relationship which should prevail. While such procedures do not 
provide a legal insulation from liability, when carried on in an at-
mosphere of good faith, they are able to treat the roots of the prob-
lem rather than merely the symptoms. 
APPENDIX 
During the preparation of this Note, the Review undertook an 
informal survey by mailing questionnaires to the editors-in-chief of 
fifty university newspapers-including those at large, small, public, 
and private institutions-as well as to the attorneys of these news-
papers. The editors-in-chief of the newspapers were asked factual 
questions concerning the size and composition of their annual bud-
gets, aid furnished to them by the university, and procedures used for 
screening potentially libelous material. The university attorneys were 
asked whether the school newspaper was separately incorporated, 
whether the university exercised, or could exercise, control, whether 
the university had ever been sued for libel in a student publication, 
and whether the university had insurance that could cover such a suit. 
l. NEWSPAPER SURVEY 
Twenty-six newspapers responded as indicated below. 
I) Annual Budgets (total of twenty-six) 
Largest 
Smallest 
2) Newspapers receiving aid from the university, 
in the form of: 
a) Student activity fees or other university 
funds. 
b) Material and services donated without 




campus mail service 
miscellaneous (budget planning, transpor-
tation, other) 
Total of newspapers receiving some form of 
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II. ATI'ORNEY SURVEY 
Twenty attorneys responded as indicated below. 
I) Form of the newspaper's organization 
a) separately incorporated 
b) unincorporated 
2) Does the university exercise control, or could 




15 /20 (75%) 
16/20 (80%) 
4/20 (20%) 
Of the four answering no, three were at universities with separately 
incorporated student newspapers. 






Of these universities one reported being sued three times, for a 
total of seven suits. Two universities supplied citations. See note 21 
supra. 
4) Does the university have insurance that would 
cover a libel action? 
Yes) 
No) 
13 /20 (65%) 
7 /20 (35%) 
